Latest HIPAA News

Cybersecurity Agencies Share Most Common Attack Vectors for Initial Access and Recommended Mitigations

According to a recent security advisory issued by the Five Eyes Cybersecurity agencies in the US, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, the most common attack vectors used by cyber threat actors for initial access to networks are exploits of public-facing applications, external remote services, trusted relationships, phishing, and compromised credentials for valid user accounts.

These attack methods often succeed due to poor security practices, bad cyber hygiene, weak controls, and poor security configurations. The security advisory details the most commonly exploited controls and practices and provides recommendations for mitigations to strengthen security and block these attack vectors.

Top 10 Security Weaknesses Exploited by Hackers

The top ten security weaknesses exploited by hackers consist of poor security practices, weak security controls, and misconfigurations and unsecured systems, which allow the most common attack vectors to be used.

Slow software updates and patching

The failure to update software promptly and apply patches for known vulnerabilities gives attackers a window of opportunity for exploiting the vulnerabilities. Exploits for vulnerabilities are often released publicly within days or weeks. Vulnerabilities can be exploited to gain access to sensitive information, conduct denial-of-service attacks, or take full control of vulnerable systems. Slow patching is one of the commonest poor security practices.

Open ports and misconfigurations that expose services to the Internet

Another commonly identified vulnerability is the failure to close open ports. Hackers continuously scan for open ports and misconfigured services that expose systems to the Internet. The compromising of these services can provide attackers with initial access. RDP, Server Message Block (SMB), Telnet, and NetBIOS are high-risk services.

Failure to enforce multifactor authentication

Multifactor authentication should be enforced on all accounts to block attempts to use stolen credentials. This is especially important for Remote Desktop Protocol, other remote services, and accounts with administrative privileges. The lack of multifactor authentication for RDP is commonly exploited in ransomware attacks.

Use of default credentials and configurations

The failure to change default credentials provides attackers with easy access, as default credentials are often in the public domain. Default configurations are typically excessively permissible to ensure they are user-friendly, and the failure to change configurations can give attackers an avenue for exploitation.

Insufficient controls for remote access

Remote services are commonly targeted by threat actors who exploit a lack of sufficient authentication controls, such as no multifactor authentication. In addition to enforcing MFA, network defenders should consider implementing a boundary firewall in front of a VPN and IDS/IPS sensors to detect anomalous activity.

Incorrectly applied privileges or permissions, and errors within access control lists

Incorrectly applied privileges or permissions can prevent access control rules from being enforced, which could allow system processes or unauthorized users to be granted access to objects.

Poor password policies

Many different methods can be used to exploit weak, leaked, or compromised passwords to access victims’ systems. Policies should be set and enforced requiring strong, unique passwords to be used. Weak RDP passwords are commonly exploited.

Unprotected cloud services

Misconfigurations and poor security configurations can leave cloud services unprotected, giving threat actors easy access to sensitive data and permitting cryptojacking using cloud servers.

Insufficient phishing defenses

Phishing is one of the leading ways that threat actors gain a foothold in networks. Email security solutions should be used that have strong antivirus controls, use behavioral analysis to identify malware, and have the capability to scan embedded links. Security awareness training should be regularly provided to the workforce.

Poor endpoint detection and response

Endpoint detection solutions should be implemented that go beyond signature-based detection methods as threat actors commonly use obfuscated malicious scripts and PowerShell to bypass endpoint security solutions such as antivirus software.

Suggested Mitigations

The security alert includes several mitigations that can help network defenders strengthen security and protect against these commonly exploited weak security controls and practices. The suggested mitigations are concerned with controlling access, credential hardening, establishing centralized log management, deploying antivirus and other detection tools, conducting vulnerability scans, establishing a robust patch management program, and maintaining a rigorous configuration management program.

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Five Eyes Intelligence Alliance Warns of Increase in Cyberattacks Targeting Managed Service Providers

The Five Eyes intelligence alliance, which consists of cybersecurity agencies from the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, has issued a joint alert warning about the increasing number of cyberattacks targeting managed service providers (MSPs).

MSPs are attractive targets for cybercriminals and nation-state threat actors. Many businesses rely on MSPs to provide information and communication technology (ICT) and IT infrastructure services, as it is often easier and more cost-effective than developing the capabilities to handle those functions internally.

In order to provide those services, MSPs require trusted connectivity and privileged access to the networks of their clients. Cyber threat actors target vulnerable MSPs and use them as the initial access vector to gain access to the networks of all businesses and organizations that they support. It is far easier to conduct a cyberattack on a vulnerable MSP and gain access to the networks of dozens of businesses than to target those businesses directly.

When MSP systems are compromised, it may take several months before the intrusion is detected, during which time threat actors may conduct cyber espionage on the MSP and its customers or prepare for other follow-on activities such as ransomware attacks.

The Five Eyes agencies provide recommendations for baseline security measures that MSPs and their customers should implement and also recommend customers review their contracts with MSPs to ensure that the contracts specify that their MSPs must implement the recommended measures and controls.

Steps need to be taken to improve defenses to prevent the initial compromise. Cyber threat actors commonly exploit vulnerable devices and Internet-facing services and conduct phishing and brute force attacks to gain a foothold in MSP networks. The Five Eyes agencies recommend MSPs and their customers:

  • Improve the security of vulnerable devices
  • Protect internet-facing services
  • Defend against brute force and password spraying
  • Defend against phishing

It is vital to enable or improve monitoring and logging processes to allow intrusions to be rapidly detected. Since threat actors may compromise networks for months, all organizations should store their most important logs for at least six months. “Whether through a comprehensive security information and event management (SIEM) solution or discrete logging tools, implement and maintain a segregated logging regime to detect threats to networks,” suggest the agencies in the alert.

It is important to secure remote access applications and enforce multi-factor authentication as far as possible, and ensure MFA is implemented on all accounts that allow access to customer environments. Customers of MSPs should ensure that their contracts state that MFA must be used on accounts that are used to access their systems.

The Five Eyes agencies also suggest

  • Managing internal architecture risks and segregating internal networks
  • Applying the principle of least privilege
  • Deprecating obsolete accounts and infrastructure
  • Applying software updates and patches promptly
  • Backing up systems and data regularly and testing backups
  • Developing and exercising incident response and recovery plans
  • Understanding and proactively managing supply chain risk
  • Promoting transparency
  • Managing account authentication and authorization

MSPs and their customers will have unique environments, so the recommendations should be applied as appropriate in accordance with their specific security needs and appropriate regulations.

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HC3 Highlights Trends in Ransomware Attacks on the HPH Sector

The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by ransomware and other cyber threat actors are constantly evolving to evade detection and allow the groups to conduct more successful attacks. The TTPs employed in the first quarter of 2022 by ransomware gangs have been analyzed and shared by the Department of Health and Human Services’ Health Sector Cybersecurity Coordination Center (HC3).

In Q1, 2022, the majority of ransomware attacks on the Healthcare and Public Health Sector (HPH) were conducted by five ransomware-as-a-service groups. LockBit 2.0 and Conti each accounted for 31% of attacks, followed by SunCrypt (16%), ALPHV/BlackCat (11%), and Hive (11%). The financially motivated threat groups FIN7 and FIN12 have also shifted their activities and have moved to ransomware operations, with FIN7 working with ALPHV and FIN12 extensively involved in attacks on the HPH sector. FIN12’s involvement has decreased the timescale for conducting attacks from 5 days to 2 days.

Ransomware gangs often work with initial access brokers (IABs) that specialize in gaining access to organizations’ networks, then sell the access to the ransomware gangs. The use of IABs helps ransomware gangs concentrate on developing their ransomware variants and running their RaaS operations, which allows them to work on their TTPs and conduct more successful attacks. HC3 has not observed any change in the numbers of IABs working with ransomware gangs in Q1, 2022, with similar numbers observed as throughout 2022.

IABs were most commonly observed advertising general VPN/RDP access to the networks of HPH entities on cybercrime forums, which accounted for more than half of forum adverts, and around 25% of advertisements were offering compromised Citrix/VPN appliances. Remote access solutions were extensively implemented by organizations to support a remote workforce during the COVID-19 pandemic, but the rush to deploy meant basic security features were not implemented, and vulnerabilities have been extensively exploited.

Ransomware gangs are increasingly using living-of-the-land (LOTL) techniques in their attacks, utilizing legitimate tools that are already available in the environments of large organizations during ransomware attacks such as CMD.exe, PowerShell, Task Scheduler, MSHTA, and Sysinternals. The use of these tools makes the malicious activities of the gangs harder to detect.

Tactics include the use of remote access tools such as AnyDesk, Windows Safe Mode, Atera, ScreenConnect, ManageEngine, encryption tools such as BitLocker and DiskCryptor, file transfer tools including FileZilla FTP, Microsoft Sysinternals tools such as PsExec, Procdump, and Dumpert, and open-source tools such as Cobalt Strike, Mimikatz, AdFind, Process Hacker, and MegaSync.

While the malicious use of these tools is difficult to detect by security teams, there are detection opportunities. HC3 recommends using a behavior-based approach to detection, such as a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) tool, which can detect malicious use of LOTL tools which signature-based detection tools cannot.

The HC3 Ransomware Trends in the HPH Sector Report provides detailed information on the TTPs employed by each ransomware operation, including the most commonly abused LOTL tools, relevant ATT&CK techniques, and a long list of mitigations that can be implemented to prevent, detect, respond to, and recover from ransomware attacks.

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NIST Published Updated Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management Guidance

On Thursday, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published updated cybersecurity supply chain risk management (C-SCRM) guidance to help organizations develop an effective program for identifying, assessing, and responding to cybersecurity risks throughout the supply chain.

Cyber threat actors are increasingly targeting the supply chain. A successful attack on a single supplier can allow the threat actor to compromise the networks of all companies that use the product or service, as was the case with the REvil ransomware attack on Kaseya in 2021. The threat actors exploited a vulnerability in Kaseya VSA software and the attack affected up to 1,500 businesses.

The publication, Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Systems and Organizations (NIST Special Publication 800-161 Revision 1), is the result of a multiyear process that included the release of two draft versions of the guidance. The updated guidance can be used to identify, assess, and respond to cybersecurity risks throughout the supply chain at all levels of an organization.

While organizations should consider vulnerabilities in the finished product they are considering using, the guidance also encourages them to consider the security of components of the project, which may include open source code or components developed by third parties. A product or device may have been designed in one country, manufactured in another, and incorporate components from many other countries, which in turn may have been assembled from parts provided by disparate manufacturers. Malicious code may have been incorporated into components, and vulnerabilities may have been introduced that could be exploited by cyber threat actors. The guidance encourages organizations to consider the journey that each of the components took to reach their destination.

The guidance is aimed at acquirers and end users of products, software, and services. Since the guidance is intended to be used by a wide audience, user profiles are included that explain which sections of the guidance are most relevant for each group. “The publication integrates cybersecurity supply chain risk management (C-SCRM) into risk management activities by applying a multilevel, C-SCRM-specific approach, including guidance on the development of C-SCRM strategy implementation plans, C-SCRM policies, C-SCRM plans, and risk assessments for products and services,” explained NIST.

The guidance can be used to build cybersecurity supply chain risk considerations and requirements into acquisition processes and create a program for continuously monitoring and managing supply chain risks.

“Managing the cybersecurity of the supply chain is a need that is here to stay,” said NIST’s Jon Boyens, one of the authors of the publication. “If your agency or organization hasn’t started on it, this is a comprehensive tool that can take you from crawl to walk to run, and it can help you do so immediately.”

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Operational Continuity-Cyber Incident Checklist Published by HSCC

The Health Sector Coordinating Council’s (HSCC) Cybersecurity Working Group (CWG) has published an Operational Continuity-Cyber Incident (OCCI) checklist which serves as a flexible template for responding to and recovering from serious cyberattacks that cause extended system outages, such as ransomware attacks.

Ransomware attacks on healthcare organizations increased significantly during the pandemic and continue to be conducted at elevated levels. Ransomware threat actors steal sensitive data that has a high value on the black market, threaten to publish that data to pressure visitors into paying, and the extended system outages due to the attacks can cause considerable financial losses, increasing the probability of the ransom being paid. Warnings have recently been issued by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) about ransomware groups that are actively targeting critical infrastructure, including healthcare organizations.

In addition to cybercriminal groups, hospitals are a target for nation-state threat actors. The Five Eyes cybersecurity agencies recently warned that there is an elevated threat of cyberattacks on critical infrastructure in retaliation to the sanctions imposed on Russia by the United States. There is also a risk that healthcare organizations may fall victim to cyber incidents that have been directed at organizations in Ukraine, as was the case with the NotPetya wiper malware attacks in 2017. The development and release of the checklist were accelerated in light of the rising geopolitical tensions from the Ukraine-Russia conflict, and the increased threat to healthcare organizations in the United States.

Due to the high risk of attacks, healthcare organizations need to prepare for attacks and ensure that the business can continue to operate should it not be possible to immediately restore access to critical systems. Having an incident response plan that can be immediately implemented will help to minimize the damage caused and the impact on patients and medical services.

The OCCI toolkit includes a checklist of the steps that should be taken during the first 12 hours after a security incident occurs and outlines actions and considerations for the duration of cybersecurity incidents. The checklist is broken down into role-based modules that align with the Incident Command System but can be refined or modified to match the size, resources, complexity, and capabilities of different organizations, from small physician practices up to large hospitals and health systems.

An incident commander should be appointed to provide overall strategic direction on all response actions and activities, a medical-technical specialist should advise the Incident Commander on issues related to the response, and a public information officer is required to communicate with internal and external stakeholders, site personnel, patients and their families, and the media. The checklist also provides a list of steps that need to be completed by the safety officer and section chiefs. For smaller organizations, those roles may need to be combined to suit their organizational structures.

The checklist was created from input provided by leading health sector cybersecurity and emergency management executives that participate in the HSCC Incident Response/Business Continuity (IRBC) Task Group.

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15 Most Exploited Vulnerabilities in 2021

The Five Eyes security agencies, an alliance of intelligence agencies from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, have issued a joint advisory about the 15 vulnerabilities in software and operating systems that were most commonly targeted by nation-state hackers and cybercriminal organizations in 2021.

Throughout 2021, malicious cyber actors targeted newly disclosed critical software vulnerabilities in attacks against a wide range of industry sectors, including public and private sector organizations. 11 of the most routinely targeted vulnerabilities were publicly disclosed in 2021, although older vulnerabilities continue to be exploited. The 15 most exploited vulnerabilities include 9 that allow remote code execution, 2 elevation of privilege flaws, and security bypass, path traversal, arbitrary file reading, and arbitrary code execution flaws.

Top of the list was the maximum severity Log4Shell vulnerability in the Apache Log4j open source logging framework. The vulnerability – CVE-2021-44228 – can be remotely exploited by a threat actor allowing the execution of arbitrary code, which would give the attacker full control of a vulnerable system. The vulnerability was only disclosed publicly in December 2021, yet still ranked first as the most commonly exploited vulnerability, demonstrating how hackers can quickly weaponize and exploit vulnerabilities before organizations can patch. The flaw was rated one of the most serious vulnerabilities to be discovered in the past decade.

CVE Vulnerability Name Vendor and Product Type
CVE-2021-44228 Log4Shell Apache Log4j Remote code execution (RCE)
CVE-2021-40539 Zoho ManageEngine AD SelfService Plus RCE
CVE-2021-34523 ProxyShell Microsoft Exchange Server Elevation of privilege
CVE-2021-34473 ProxyShell Microsoft Exchange Server RCE
CVE-2021-31207 ProxyShell Microsoft Exchange Server Security feature bypass
CVE-2021-27065 ProxyLogon Microsoft Exchange Server RCE
CVE-2021-26858 ProxyLogon Microsoft Exchange Server RCE
CVE-2021-26857 ProxyLogon Microsoft Exchange Server RCE
CVE-2021-26855 ProxyLogon Microsoft Exchange Server RCE
CVE-2021-26084 Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center Arbitrary code execution
CVE-2021-21972 VMware vSphere Client RCE
CVE-2020-1472 ZeroLogon Microsoft Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC) Elevation of privilege
CVE-2020-0688 Microsoft Exchange Server RCE
CVE-2019-11510 Pulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure Arbitrary file reading
CVE-2018-13379 Fortinet FortiOS and FortiProxy Path traversal

The remote code execution vulnerability in Zoho ManageEngine AD SelfService Plus – CVE-2021-40539 – has a 9.8 CVSS severity rating and was the second most exploited vulnerability, with attacks exploiting the vulnerability continuing in 2022. The flaw can be exploited remotely and allows web shells to be implanted in a network, allowing the attacker to compromise credentials, move laterally, and exfiltrate sensitive data.

The ProxyLogon flaws in Microsoft Exchange email servers were also extensively exploited. These flaws – CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-27065 – allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable exchange servers to gain access to files and mailboxes on the servers, along with any credentials stored on the servers.

Three ProxyShell vulnerabilities made the top 15 list. These vulnerabilities – CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-31207 – can be exploited on Microsoft Exchange email servers that have the Microsoft Client Access Service (CAS) exposed to the Internet. This is a common configuration that allows users to access their emails on their mobile devices and via web browsers. The flaws can be exploited to remotely execute arbitrary code on vulnerable servers.

In many cases, vulnerabilities were exploited within two weeks of the vulnerabilities being publicly disclosed, most commonly as a result of security researchers publishing proof-of-concept exploits, which helped a much broader range of threat actors quickly exploit the vulnerabilities before organizations had the time to patch.

A further 21 vulnerabilities are listed that are also routinely exploited, including many from 2021 and some dating back to 2017.  Patching these vulnerabilities promptly will ensure they cannot be exploited. The Five Eyes agencies have also included a list of mitigations that make it harder for threat actors to exploit these and other vulnerabilities.

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HHS Warns HPH Sector About Insider Threats in Healthcare

Healthcare data breaches are occurring in record numbers, but not all privacy and security threats come from outside the organization. The Department of Health and Human Services’ Health Sector Cybersecurity Coordination Center (HCC) has recently issued a warning about the threat from within.

Insider Threats in Healthcare

Nation-state hacking groups, cybercriminal gangs, and lone hackers have long targeted the healthcare industry, but there is also a significant threat of data breaches due to insiders. Insider threats are those involving individuals within a healthcare organization, such as employees, but also contractors and business associates that have been provided with access to healthcare assets and systems. These individuals may be aware of the security practices employed by the organization and have awareness of the network, computer systems, and the location of sensitive data. Oftentimes they will have been provided with access to sensitive data to complete their work or contracted duties.

According to the Verizon 2021 Data Breach Report, there was a decline in external threats between 2017 and 2020 and a corresponding rise in internal threats. Insider threats include healthcare employees who abuse their access rights to steal patient data to commit identity theft and financial fraud, inside agents that steal sensitive data and provide that information to third parties, and disgruntled employees that wish to cause harm to their employers.

Data breaches involving these kinds of insider threats are often covered by the media and healthcare organizations often commit significant resources to protect against and identify these threats. Monitoring systems are employed to monitor for unauthorized accessing of healthcare records to identify employees who have been snooping on patient records or stealing sensitive data; however, the Ponemon Institute’s 2020 Insider Threats Report suggests these incidents only account for a relatively small percentage of insider threat incidents – around 14%.

Other insider threats include negligent and careless workers that act inappropriately and individuals that accidentally put IT systems and data at risk without their knowledge. The Ponemon Institute’s report suggests 61% of insider threat incidents are due to negligent insiders, with credential theft due to negligent insiders accounting for 25% of insider threat incidents.

Negligent insider incidents can be caused by employees not being aware of security policies, which is often a training issue. Employees should be made aware of the organization’s security policies during the onboarding process and should be periodically reminded about those policies thereafter as part of regular security awareness training.

Insider threats often involve data theft, fraud, or system sabotage, all of which can cause harm to the organization and patients/plan members. The Ponemon Institute’s study suggests global organizations lose $11.45 million annually as a result of insider threats.

Insider Threat Prevention, Detection, and Response

“Deterrence, detection analysis, and post-breach forensics are key areas of insider threat prevention,” suggests HC3, which also recommends revising and updating cybersecurity policies and guidelines, limiting privileged access and establishing role-based access control, implementing zero-trust and MFA models, backing up data and deploying data loss prevention tools, and managing USB devices across the corporate network.

Detecting threats requires constant monitoring of user activity and regular audits of access and activity logs. A security information and event management (SIEM) system should be considered to help with the logging, monitoring, and auditing of employee actions.

Insider threat awareness should form a part of security awareness training, which should be provided to employees during onboarding, with refresher training provided periodically thereafter. Employees should only be given access to the resources they need to complete their work duties, and strict password and access management policies and practices should be implemented. A formal insider threat mitigation program should also be developed along with an incident response plan to ensure prompt and effective actions can be taken when insider threats are identified.

You can view the HC3 Insider Threats in Healthcare Report here (PDF).

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March 2022 Healthcare Data Breach Report

For the fourth successive month, the number of reported healthcare data breaches has fallen. In March 2022, 43 healthcare data breaches of 500 or more records were reported to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Office for Civil Rights (OCR), which is a 6.52% fall from February and well below the 12-month average of 57.75 data breaches a month.

healthcare data breaches past 12 months - March 2022

However, there was a 36.94% increase in the number of breached records compared to February. Across the 43 reported breaches, 3,083,988 healthcare records were exposed, stolen, or impermissibly disclosed, which is slightly below the average of 3,424,818 breached records a month over the past 12 months.

number of breached healthcare recovers over the past 12 months - March 2022

Largest Healthcare Data Breaches in March 2022

In March 2022, there were 25 data breaches reported to OCR that affected 10,000 or more individuals, all but one of which were hacking incidents. The largest data breach of the month affected over half a million patients. Christie Business Holdings Company, which operates Christie Clinic in Illinois, discovered an employee email account had been accessed by unauthorized individuals and was used in a business email compromise (BEC) attack to try to divert payment to a third-party vendor. BEC attacks may account for a relatively small percentage of healthcare data breaches, but according to figures from the FBI, they are the biggest cause of losses to cybercrime.

SuperCare Health reported a major breach from July 2021 where hackers accessed its network and potentially stole patient data. Around two weeks after announcing the data breach the first lawsuit against SuperCare Health was filed. There is often a rush to file lawsuits following healthcare data breaches, and it is now common for multiple lawsuits to be filed.

CSI Laboratories reported a cyberattack that was discovered in February. While the nature of the attack was not disclosed, the Conti ransomware gang claimed responsibility for the attack and published a sample of the stolen data on its data leak site to pressure the lab into paying the ransom. Double extortion tactics, where payment is required for the keys to decrypt files and to prevent the publication of stolen data, are now the norm in ransomware attacks.

Name of Covered Entity State Covered Entity Type Individuals Affected Breach Cause
Christie Business Holdings Company, P.C. IL Healthcare Provider 502,869 Hacked email account
Super Care, Inc. dba SuperCare Health CA Healthcare Provider 318,379 Unspecified hacking incident
Cytometry Specialists, Inc., d/b/a CSI Laboratories GA Healthcare Provider 312,000 Ransomware attack (Conti)
South Denver Cardiology Associates, PC CO Healthcare Provider 287,652 Unspecified hacking incident
Clinic of North Texas, LLP TX Healthcare Provider 244,174 Unspecified hacking incident
Taylor Regional Hospital KY Healthcare Provider 190,209 Unspecified hacking incident
Chelan Douglas Health District WA Healthcare Provider 188,236 Unspecified hacking and data theft incident
Urgent Team Holdings TN Healthcare Provider 166,601 Unspecified hacking incident
New Jersey Brain and Spine NJ Healthcare Provider 92,453 Unspecified hacking incident
Duncan Regional Hospital, Incorporated OK Healthcare Provider 86,379 Unspecified hacking incident
Labette Health KS Healthcare Provider 85,635 Unspecified hacking incident
Law Enforcement Health Benefits, Inc. PA Health Plan 85,282 Ransomware attack
Central Indiana Orthopedics IN Healthcare Provider 83,705 Unspecified hacking incident
Highmark Inc PA Health Plan 67,147 Hacking incident at mailing vendor
Advanced Medical Practice Management NJ Business Associate 56,427 Unspecified hacking and data theft incident
Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc. WV Healthcare Provider 54,000 Hacked email accounts (Phishing)
Resources for Human Development PA Healthcare Provider 46,673 Theft of unencrypted hard drive
Cancer and Hematology Centers of Western Michigan MI Healthcare Provider 43,071 Ransomware attack
Horizon Actuarial Services, LLC GA Business Associate 38,418 Unspecified hacking and data theft incident
Central Minnesota Mental Health Center MN Healthcare Provider 28,725 Hacked email accounts
Capital Region Medical Center MO Healthcare Provider 17,578 Unspecified hacking incident
Dialyze Direct, LLC NJ Healthcare Provider 14,203 Hacked email account
Major League Baseball Players Benefit Plan MD Health Plan 13,156 Unspecified hacking and data theft incident at a business associate
Colorado Physician Partners, PLLC CO Healthcare Provider 12,877 Hacked email account
Crossroads Health OH Healthcare Provider 10,324 Unspecified hacking and data theft incident

Causes of March 2022 Healthcare Data Breaches

The healthcare data breaches reported in March were dominated by hacking/IT incidents, which accounted for 90.7% of all data breaches reported and 98.3% of the breached healthcare records. 3,083,988 individuals were affected by those hacking incidents. The average breach size was 77,766 records and the median breach size was 17,758 records.

Causes of MArch 2022 healthcare data breaches

While the category “hacking/IT incidents” covers a broad range of causes, 31 of the incidents involved hackers gaining access to network servers where patient data was stored. 10 incidents involved unauthorized individuals gaining access to employee email accounts.

 

There were just three breaches reported as unauthorized access/disclosure incidents which involved a total of 4,447 records. The average breach size was 1,482 records and the median was 1,682 records. There was only one theft incident reported – a hard drive containing the records of 46,673 individuals was stolen.

Location of breached PHI in March 2022 healthcare data breaches

March 2022 Healthcare Data Breaches by State

HIPAA-regulated entities in 22 states and Puerto Rico reported data breaches in March 2022. New Jersey, Pennsylvania & Texas were the worst affected states with 4 breaches reported in each state.

State Number of Reported Data Breaches
New Jersey, Pennsylvania & Texas 4
Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Washington, West Virginia, and Puerto Rico 2
California, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Utah 1

HIPAA Enforcement Activity in March 2022

There were no HIPAA enforcement actions announced by the HHS’ Office for Civil Rights or state attorneys general in March 2022.

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